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A donut shop in Queen Anne's County, Maryland, found itself
defamed on the Internet by allegations of unsanitary conditions. The
speakers were identified only by their web names. The shop owner's
defamation suit named as defendants, the sponsor of the website on
which the defamation occurred, and as "John Does," the individuals
who did the actual posting under their web names. It then sought to
determine the posters' actual identities.'
The website defended its own position, successfully asserting
that the federal statute immunizing Internet service providers,2 re-
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1. Ind. Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 966 A.2d 432 (MD. 2009).
2. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (1998).
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sisted discovery of the identity of the posting individuals.3 The website
is presumably the sole source of that information. When a defamation
plaintiff seeks to ferret out the true identity of those maligning him,
constitutional doctrine comes into play. As a result, the United States
Supreme Court has, in a series of decisions, found a First Amendment
right to speak anonymously.4 Accordingly, that right includes anony-
mous Internet speech.5
The defense of this right, in the Independent Newspapers, Inc.
(hereinafter "INI") case, ultimately resulted in a decision by the Mary-
land Court of Appeals, which sought to establish definitively the
procedural requirements and standards for breaching Internet ano-
nymity. Resolution of the issue involves the collision of two conflicting
interests: the right of the defamation plaintiff to redress, and constitu-
tional protection of the right to anonymous speech.
This article will review the United States Supreme Court's ano-
nymity jurisprudence, consider the approaches taken by different state
courts to this issue, and review the Maryland case in detail. This arti-
cle will also conclude that the Maryland court's requirement (that the
decision on disclosure include a balancing test as one element of a deci-
sion whether to breach anonymity) is unworkable, unnecessary, and
inappropriate.
I. THE ISSUE
On March 21, 2006, defamatory postings of the Dunkin Donuts
store in Centreville, Maryland were made on "Newszap.com," a website
operated by Independent Newspapers, Inc. (herein "INI").6 The pos-
ters were identified as "RockyRaccoonMD" and "Suze." The allegations
were that the establishment failed to meet appropriate sanitary stan-
dards.7 Furthermore, various negative remarks about the shop owner
surrounded the offending statements.8
Zebulon J. Brodie, the owner of the shop, filed suit on May 26,
2006 in Maryland state court against INI and individuals identified by
their web names. INI's motion to dismiss was granted, as were the
suits against the three named defendants, other than the two identi-
3. Id.
4. See infra Part II.
5. Id.
6. Ind. Newspapers, Inc., 966 A.2d at 442-443.
7. Id. at 446.
8. Id.
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fled above.9 INI was, however, required by the court to comply with
plaintiffs subpoena directing it to identify the posters, RockyRac-
coonMD and Suze.10 The court made the following order:
ORDERED, that the requested protective order is denied as to
statements regarding Plaintiffs businesses to the extent providing
[sic] available discovery regarding the identity of those individuals
who made statements that the Plaintiffs food service was main-
tained in a "dirty and unsanitary-looking" manner, and was
permitting trash from its business to pollute the nearby
waterway.'.
Plaintiffs counsel provided the requested Internet thread and served a
second subpoena on INI ordering discovery of "any and all documents
and tangible things identifying and/or relating to. . . 'RockyRac-
coonMD' and 'Suze.'" 12 INI filed a motion to quash and/or for a
protective order, arguing that anonymity should be protected, and it
asserted that plaintiff had not stated an actionable claim for defama-
tion. 13 The motion was denied, INI filed a notice of appeal, and the
Maryland Court of Appeals, the state's highest court, granted certio-
rari before the case could be heard in the intermediate state appellate
court. 14
The Court of Appeals ruled that INI was correct in its assertion
that plaintiff had not stated a valid defamation claim. 15 It ruled on the
case, despite the fact that the statute of limitations had in fact run on
the claim against the two posting individuals.' 6 In doing so, the court
explained that it "granted certiorari in this case not merely to sort out
the record, but to provide guidance to the trial courts in defamation
actions, when the disclosure of an anonymous Internet communication
is sought."17
The court then surveyed out-of-state decisions on the issue.' 8 It
concluded, by holding that the trial court had abused its discretion in
denying INI's motion for a protective order, that when the court or-
dered the identification of the John Does, plaintiff had not yet "pleaded
9. Id. at 449.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 446.
12. Id. at 447.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Ind. Newspapers, Inc., 966 A.2d at 449.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 449-53.
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a valid defamation claim against any of them."19 Most significantly,
the court then adopted a five-step test to be employed by the Maryland
trial courts in deciding motions in similar cases. 20
II. ANoNYMITy, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, AND THE INTERNET
The First Amendment right to speak anonymously is well es-
tablished in Supreme Court doctrine. 21 In Talley v. California, a Los
Angeles ordinance required that any handbill distributed in the city
contain the name and address of the person preparing, distributing, or
sponsoring it. The Supreme Court held the ordinance "void on its face,"
finding it an inhibition to freedom of expression. 22 The argument that
the requirement could be justified as a prevention of "false advertising
and libel" was rejected, noting that the ordinance was "in no manner so
limited."23
In McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, the Supreme Court
reached the same result, invalidating a law (then common in many
states) that prohibited anonymous leaflets in an election campaign.
Writing for the majority, Justice John Paul Stevens found that "an au-
thor's decision to remain anonymous" is "an aspect of the freedom of
speech protected by the First Amendment."24 Moreover, the Federalist
Papers were cited as an example of anonymity (more precisely pseudo-
nymity) in a writing of historic importance. 25 The Court imposed strict
scrutiny, even though the restriction was narrower than the ban in
Talley.26 Waxing eloquent, Justice Stevens said that anonymous writ-
ing was "not a pernicious fraudulent practice, but an honorable
tradition of advocacy of dissent."27
19. Id. at 447.
20. Id. at 457; See generally infra Part IV.
21. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES, AND
POLICIES, 973-74 (3d ed. 2006); John B. Morris, Jr. & Julie M. Carpenter, Free Speech on the
Internet, 2 INTERNET LAW AND PRACTICE §24.41 (2008).
22. Id. at 65.
23. Id. at 63.
24. Id. at 341.
25. Id. at 342.
26. Id. at 347.
27. Id.; See also Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, 525 U.S. 182,
205 (1999) (invalidating a Colorado requirement that all persons circulating petitions wear
a badge bearing their name); see also Watchtower Bible and Tract Society v. Village of
Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 166 (2002) (overturning a municipal ordinance regulating door-to-
door solicitation on multiple grounds, the Court noted that the permit requirement
inhibited anonymous speech).
200
INTERNET DEFAMATION
The Supreme Court expressly held in 1997 that First Amend-
ment protection applied on the Internet.28 A 2001 district court
opinion specifically held that the right of anonymous speech on the In-
ternet "must be carefully safeguarded." 29 These cases remain
established constitutional doctrine.
The arguments offered in defense of anonymity include the as-
sumption that this protection encourages speech, that speakers may
believe that acceptance of their message will be colored by knowledge
of the speaker's identity, and that the speaker may want to disclose
confidential information without revealing the speaker's identity.30
The cases cited above have helped preserve Internet anonymity. To
illustrate, Reno is one of a series of cases finding unconstitutional fed-
eral legislation aimed at protecting children from offensive material on
the Internet, the Supreme Court emphasized that there was no reason
to apply a reduced level of First Amendment protection to Internet
communications. 31
A. Anonymity and the Defamation Plaintiff
The First Amendment has something to say about all speech; it
leaves only five categories without constitutional protection. 32 Early
case law included defamation as an unprotected category, but New
28. Id. at 870; Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).
"Finally, unlike the conditions that prevailed when Congress first authorized regulation of
the broadcast spectrum, the Internet can hardly be considered a 'scarce' expressive
commodity. It provides relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity for communication of all
kinds. The Government estimates that '[als many as 40 million people use the Internet
today, and that figure is expected to grow to 200 million by 1999."'[footnote omitted] This
dynamic, multifaceted category of communication includes not only traditional print and
news services, but also audio, video, and still images, as well as interactive, real-time
dialogue. Through the use of chat rooms, any person with a phone line can become a town
crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox. Through the use of
Web pages, mail exploders, and newsgroups, the same individual can become a
pamphleteer. As the District Court found, "the content on the Internet is as diverse as
human thought." Id. at 842 (finding 74). We agree with its conclusion that our cases provide
no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this
medium."
29. Doe v. 2THE1VIART.com Inc., 140 F.Supp.2d 1088, 1097 (Wash. 2001).
30. Ind. Newspapers, Inc., supra note 6, at 431.
31. Reno, 521 U.S. at 870; see generally Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe:
Defamation & Disclosure in Cyberspace, 49 DuKE L.J. 855(2008).
32. Id. at 224; see also United States v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218 (3d Cir. 2008), cert.
granted 129 S. Ct. 1984 (2009)(listing as unprotected categories of speech: child
pornography, when actual children are involved in its production, fighting words,
incitement, obscenity and threats. The case points out that the Supreme Court has not
found a category of speech to be unprotected since 1982.).
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York Times v. Sullivan and its progeny have imposed a set of constitu-
tional limitations on defamation plaintiffs.33
The plaintiff attempting a defamation suit against a pseudony-
mous defendant thus faces two constitutional doctrines: the right of
anonymity and the protections afforded under New York Times. The
latter are only peripherally involved in this discussion, although the
courts do refer to them when discussing pleading requirements;3 4 in
contrast, the right of anonymity cannot be absolute. Virtually any
analysis of the balance of societal interests would conclude that the law
cannot allow the Internet to become a sanctuary for defamation.
The courts, faced with motions to disclose a defendant's iden-
tity, have considered four related questions: What must a plaintiff
plead, to reach behind the screen name of the offending party? Is any
element of proof required, at the point that, plaintiff requests disclo-
sure of defendant's identity? Do the merits of the plaintiffs case enter
into the decision at this preliminary stage? Finally, is the nature or
quality of defendant's speech a relevant factor?
Speaking generally, the Constitution does not sufficiently safe-
guard tort plaintiffs. The Supreme Court's defamation jurisprudence
protects defendants in the interest of shielding free expression from
undue burdens. 35 Moreover, the Court has held that plaintiffs have no
constitutional interest in reputation. 36 Justices Douglas and Black
have dissented in defamation cases, asserting that the First Amend-
ment absolutely protects expression with respect to government
officials.3 7 That view has never prevailed; and it can be questioned
whether state law, which completely eliminates defamation actions for
a specific category of individuals, would be constitutional.3 8 Therefore,
resolution of the conflict boils down to defining the process and stan-
dard required to reach trial in a tort claim, when the constitutional
protection of anonymous speech is asserted as a barrier.
33. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see generally CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 21, at 1044-1055.
34. See Doe v Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005); see infra Part III.
35. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 1044-45.
36. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (holding that plaintiff could not invoke section
1983 as a deprivation of liberty by injury to his reputation).
37. New York Times Company v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293 (Black, J., concurring).
38. In that sense the federal intervention into state tort law in the defamation area is
parallel to the Court's punitive damages jurisprudence, which is entirely protective of
defendants, with no constitutional interest in punitive damage claimants visible. See
Charles S. Doskow, The State Farm Punitive Damage Multiplier in the Courts: Early
Returns, 17 ST. THOMAs L. REv. 61 (2004).
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III. THE CASE
Zebulon J. Brodie, the owner of a local Dunkin Donuts
franchise, sued the INI website and the anonymous speakers on the
basis of the following online statements:
RockyRaccoonMD:39 I wouldn't go to that Dunkin' Donuts ... any-
way . .. have you taken a close look at it lately? One ... most dirty
and unsanitary-looking food-service places I ... seen.
Suze: I haven't seen the inside of a DD in a while, but have you seen
the outside? I drove th ... through not long ago and was completely
and utterly SHOCKED at the amount of trash that is . .. and sides
of that building. It's apparent no one is cleaning the outside oft he
[sic] building and the . . . wafting into the river that runs right
alongside. [smiley face symbol]
RockyRaccoonMD: I wouldn't go to that Dunkin' Donuts of Brodie's
anyway ... take a close look at it lately? One of the most dirty and
... looking food-service places I have seen. . . I bought coffee ...
couple of times but quickly lost my appetite . 40
Plaintiff Brodie sought discovery that would disclose the identi-
ties of the two speakers. INI moved to quash and for a protective
order, arguing to maintain anonymity, and contending that plaintiff
failed to state an actionable claim for defamation.41 The trial court de-
nied the motion and INI appealed. The Court of Appeal granted
certiorari, precluding intermediate review by the Court of Special Ap-
peals.42 The court expressly stated that it was issuing its opinion to
guide trial courts in future cases. 43
39. RockyRaccoonMD should not be confused with "Rookie Raccoon," the mascot of the
Hudson Valley Renegades baseball team of the New York-Penn League.
40. Ind. Newspapers, Inc., 966 A.2d at 446-47. The ellipses resulted from words being
cut off on the right hand side of the page.
41. The "Policies and Disclaimers" of the ISP provided in part: "PRIVATE POLICY:
While we preserve one's right to anonymity on the forum pages, we do require each
individual to register a user name, email address and password. This protects newszap.com
AND the individual from false representations. Individuals posting libelous or defamatory
comments are not welcome at this site and are granted no right of anonymity should a court
of law seek a poster's identity." Id. at 444 n.13. A federal statute requires such notification.
47 U.S.C. 551(c)(2). [In light of this statement, was INI obligated to defend the posters'
identity?] INI also argued its immunity under 47 U.S.C. § 230 (c)(1)(2000), The Federal
Communications and Decency Act. The trial court granted INI immunity on this basis,
while ordering it to disclose the requested information; see also Ind. Newspapers, Inc., 966
A.2d at 445.
42. Id. at 447.
43. Id. at 435.
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A. The Approaches44
INI addressed the issue in detail.4 5 After finding the law to be
as set forth in part III above, the Maryland Court of Appeals reviewed
the approaches that sister courts had taken.46 The court correctly
stated the issue: Web posters have a First Amendment right to remain
anonymous, but viable causes of action for defamation should not be
defeated by their anonymous postings on the Internet.4 7 It then re-
viewed several out of state cases which had attempted to resolve the
conflict.48
1. Early Cases Set Forth a "Good Faith" Test
Two cases claimed to be the first to address the issue of piercing
Internet anonymity in a litigation context; each minimized the burdens
for plaintiff to discover defendants' true identity.49 In the earlier of the
two cases, in 1999 the District Court for the Northern District of Cali-
fornia was faced with demands by SeesCandy for disclosure of the
identity of a party advertising its products on the Internet under an
allegedly infringing name.50
The district court decided the case by creating its own four-part
test: (1) The defendant must be identified sufficiently to assure federal
jurisdiction of the case; (2) plaintiff must disclose all steps taken to
identify the posting party; (3) plaintiff must satisfy the court that it
could survive a motion to dismiss; and (4) plaintiff must file its discov-
ery request with the court, with reasons, and identification of persons
who might provide the required information.5 1
44. The cases analyzed by the INI court were not all the cases previously decided on
the issue, but they included all the issues and considerations required for the court's
analysis; see also Krinsky v. Doe, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d (Cal. App. 2008).
45. Ind. Newspapers, Inc., passim.
46. Id. In acknowledging that anonymity may be limited by "defamation
considerations" the court cites two entirely inapposite cases, Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343
U.S. 250 (1952) which makes the outdated and overruled blanket statement that libel is
completely unprotected, and Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) which
makes the same generalization. Both cases antedate New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and
its progeny, which have established current constitutional doctrine limiting defamation
recovery.
47. Ind. Newspapers, Inc., 966 A.2d at 449.
48. Id. at 449-50.
49. Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999) and In re
Subpoena Duces Tecum, 52 Va. Cir.26 (2000).
50. Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
51. Ind. Newspapers, Inc., 966 A.2d at 446-47 (quoting Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.
com, 185 F.R.D 573 at 578-80).
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Under barebones federal pleading rules, surviving a motion to
dismiss requires only a statement of the claim.52 Thus, the third afore-
mentioned requirement turns the plaintiffs attempt to learn the
identity of his defamer into a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.5 3 To illustrate, the
court in Columbia satisfyingly held that plaintiff had made a factual
submission sufficient to meet the burden, pleading actual infringement
of its trademarks, and submitting thirty-one instances of actual
confusion.54
A Virginia circuit court reached a similar result in In re Sub-
poena Duces Tecum to America Online, Inc. 55 Anonymous individuals
had posted defamatory information about plaintiff in violation of fidu-
ciary duties and contractual obligations in chat rooms on AOL.5 6 AOL
moved to quash the subpoena, but its motion was denied. The court
first asked a constitutional question: "Whether the subpoena would un-
reasonably burden the anonymous rights of the John Does."5 7 After
citing Talley and McIntyre the court found that the right of anonymity
must be balanced against the need to assure that abusers may be
called to account; but the court answered the question by misstating
the law and mis-citing authority.58 Citing Beauharnais, the court said
that defamatory statements are outside constitutional protection, as
would be the release of confidential information about a publicly
traded company.59 It avoids this question by finding a compelling in-
terest in the state of Indiana in protecting "companies operating within
its borders.60
The court then framed a "two [sic] prong test" for piercing ano-
nymity:6 1 (1) the Court must be satisfied by the pleadings or evidence;
52. See FED. R. Civ. P.12.
53. See Ind. Newspapers, Inc., 966 A.2d at 446-47; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
54. Columbia Ins. Co., 185 F.R.D. at 579-80.
55. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc.,52 Va. Cir. 26, 37(2000), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom., America Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542
S.E.2d 377 (Va. 2001). The appellate court reversed on the ground that plaintiff corporation
was not entitled to proceed anonymously. Id. at 8. The case involved the anomaly of an
anonymous plaintiff attempting to sue anonymous defendants, with additional issues of
comity. Id. at 1. It is of interest partly because the court, like the Seescandy court, stated
that it was the first to address the Internet anonymity issue in this context. Id. at 3.
56. See id at 1.
57. Id. at 8.
58. Id. at 5.
59. Id. at 7 (citing Beauharnais for the proposition of no protection, although that
precedent has long since been rendered obsolete by the New York Times v. Sullivan line of
cases. It misstates the date of Beauharnais in citing it, attributing it to 1992 rather than
1952).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 6.
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(2) the party requesting the subpoena has a "legitimate, good faith ba-
sis to contend that it [has been] the victim of conduct actionable in the
jurisdiction" in which the suit was filed; and (3) that the subpoenaed
identity information is "centrally needed to advance that claim."62 The
court found the interest in protecting companies' reputations out-
weighed the "limited intrusion" into the anonymous speaker's rights. 63
This "good faith" test requires very little beyond a well-pleaded com-
plaint, but this plaintiff flunked even this test.64 What is missing is a
definition of what the plaintiff must show to proceed with his case. The
court did not require a showing of efforts to identify the speaker as a
condition of disclosure.
2. New Jersey Raises the Bar - Somewhat
In contrast, a New Jersey appellate court denied plaintiffs mo-
tion to discover identities, using a different standard.6 5 Pseudonymous
statements on a website accused Dendrite International, Inc., a devel-
oper of marketing systems largely for the pharmaceutical industry, of
inflating its earnings report, and "shopping" the company.66 The com-
pany brought suit against the John Doe defendants accused of web
posting the statements. The trial court granted Dendrite's motion to
ascertain the identities of two defendants, Doe 1 and Doe 2, but denied
it as to Doe 3.67
On Dendrite's appeal of the Doe 3 dismissal, the appellate panel
found that the plaintiff was first required, under these circumstances,
to establish facts "sufficient to maintain a prima facie case."6 8 It rea-
soned that revelation of defendant's identity depended on whether or
not the statements were defamatory.6 9 The court said that if the state-
ments were lawful, they merited constitutional protection;70 but it
found that that standard provided inadequate protection for defend-
ants.7 1 Like the Maryland court in INI, the court stated that it was
62. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 52 Va. Cir. at 37.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Dendrite International, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. 2001).
66. Id. at 763.
67. Id. at 760.
68. Doe I v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249 (D.Conn. 2008)A federal district court
recently reviewed the alternative approaches taken by the courts, and expressly adopted the
Dendrite approach.
69. Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 766.
70. Compare In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 52 Va. Cir. 26 (mistating the standard for
protected speech. The court is making the same error).
71. See Dendrite, 775 A.2d 764.
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establishing guidelines for the lower courts to follow. 7 2The court ac-
knowledged that the prima facie standard was more onerous than the
motion to dismiss standard.7 3 Adopting the Virginia analysis, the
court found that the third prong of that test required a "flexible, non-
technical application of the motion to dismiss standard."74 As the court
explained, a fact-sensitive inquiry was required: "Here, although Den-
drite's defamation claims would survive a traditional motion to dismiss
for failure to state a cause of action, we conclude the motion judge ap-
propriately reviewed Dendrite's claim with a level of scrutiny
consistent with the procedures and standards we adopt here
today. .. 75
The trial judge had relied on the SeesCandy holding to require a
prima facie case of defamation against Doe 3, and denied Dendrite the
limited discovery it sought, on the ground that it had not shown that
the statements caused it any harm.76 The court concluded, "la]lthough
Dendrite alleges that it has been harmed and that it will continue to be
harmed by the defendants' statements, saying so does not make the
alleged harm a verifiable reality."77 The court emphasized that it was
striking a balance between the competing interests, including "the
right of the plaintiff to protect its proprietary interests and reputa-
tion."78 Nonetheless, there is no mention of the Constitution on
plaintiffs side of the equation.
3. Delaware Adopts a New, Higher Standard
The Delaware Supreme Court was the first state Supreme
Court to address the attempt to pierce the veil and identify an offend-
ing poster, and its holding raised the bar that the earlier cases had set.
For instance, in Doe v. Cahill, a town councilman and his wife sued
Comcast, the ISP, to require it to identify an alleged defamer.79 The
trial court found "good faith" on the part of the plaintiff and held that
the plaintiffs met the requirements of (1) a legitimate good faith basis
for their claim, (2) the information being required to prosecute the suit,
and (3) there being no other source.8 0
72. Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 760.
73. Id. at 771.
74. Id. at 770.
75. Id. at 771.
76. Id. at 768.
77. Id. at 769.
78. Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 760.
79. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 454 (Del. 2005).
80. Id. at 455.
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On appeal by the pseudonymous defendant, asserting that his
First Amendment rights had been violated, the Delaware Supreme
Court found that the trial court's standard provided inadequate consti-
tutional protection.8 ' The court then held that a defamation plaintiff,
seeking to determine the speaker's identity, must be required to sup-
port his claim with "facts sufficient to defeat a summary judgment
motion."82 That ruling constituted a rejection of the Dendrite stan-
dard, which required balancing, stating, "[t]he fourth Dendrite
requirement, that the trial court balance the defendant's First Amend-
ment rights against the strength of the plaintiffs prima facie case is
also unnecessary. The summary judgment test is itself the balance."83
The court found that to meet that standard, the plaintiff must
submit evidence "creating a genuine issue of material fact for all the
elements of a defamation claim within the plaintiffs control."8 4 Since
the defendant in the case was a city councilman, and thus a public
official, the plaintiff would be required, under New York Times v. Sulli-
van to show falsity and malice.85 Since these facts were not necessarily
within plaintiffs knowledge, the court did not require the element of
showing malice to be met at this stage.8 6
According to the Delaware court, the higher burden was re-
quired because "substantial harm may come from allowing a plaintiff
to compel the disclosure of an anonymous defendant's identity by sim-
ply showing that his complaint can survive a motion to dismiss or that
it was filed in good faith."87 The higher summary judgment standard
more appropriately protects against "the chilling effect on anonymous
First Amendment Internet speech that can arise when plaintiffs bring
trivial defamation lawsuits primarily to harass or unmask their crit-
ics."88 Moreover, the Delaware ruling substantially elevates plaintiffs
burden. The court justifies the burden by derogatory comments on the
nature of Internet dialog.8 9 Lack of editorial control and reliability,
81. Id. at 457.
82. Id. at 460(requiring that the plaintiff must give the posting defendant sufficient
notice to allow him to fight the discovery request).
83. Id. at 461.
84. Id. at 463.
85. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (mandating, as a
constitutional matter, that a defamation plaintiff suing a public official demonstrate that
the defendant acted with "actual malice" if the defamed party is a public official); see also
Nathaniel Gleicher, John Doe Subpoenas: Toward a Consistent Legal Standard, 118 YALE.
L.J. 320, 336, (2008).
86. Doe, 884 A.2d at 464.
87. Id. at 459.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 465-66.
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and the ease of plaintiffs reply through the same medium, are among
the considerations cited by the court in requiring scrutiny of the
claim.90
Ultimately the court reviewed the complaint, and found that it
could not meet the state law requirement of elements for a defamation
cause of action.9 1 The offending statements would be interpreted as
opinion and therefore, not actionable. 92 This Delaware rule of law is to
be binding on their state trial courts, whereas a plaintiff at his peril
must not just plead, but must go forward with sufficient evidence to
show no triable issue of fact with respect to five prima facie elements.93
It is questionable whether any other cause of action outside the class
action area must meet this standard at the starting gate. 94
IV. MARYLAND ELECTS THE MIDDLE GROUND, WITH BALANCING
The Maryland Court of Appeals reviewed each of these holdings
in detail, to assist it in formulating a policy for the trial courts. In INI
it identified three distinct tests from the foregoing cases: a "good faith"
test, a "prima facie" test, and a "summary judgment" test.95 First, the
court found the AOL "good faith" or "motion to dismiss" tests too weak,
and insufficiently protective of speech.96 These tests, it decided, would
inhibit use of the Internet by unduly exposing web posting parties to
defamation suits.9 7 On the other hand, the Maryland court found the
90. Id.
91. Id. at 467.
92. Among the court's reasons for imposing a strict requirement are the state's
permissive pleading standards, which follow the federal model, which preclude dismissal on
motion unless the trial court determines that there is no set of facts that would entitle
plaintiff to judgment. Following that rule would render the "good faith standard" too easy
to satisfy. Id. at 458.
93. Del. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56; Id.at 457.
94. See Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombley, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); see Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009) (suggesting that gatekeeper issues may take on increasing
significance); see generally Nathaniel Gleicher, supra note 88, at 351.
95. Two cases reviewed by the Maryland court without classifying them illustrate that
the holdings do not always fit into one category or another. Id. at 453-457; see In Mobilisa v.
Doe, 170 P.3d 712 (Ariz. 2007) (adopting an amalgam of Cahill and Dendrite, requiring that
plaintiff provide facts sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion, and then balanced
the strength of plaintiffs case against the need for disclosure of the defendant's identity);
see also Sony Music Entm't Inc. v. Does 1-40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (utilizing
elements of both Seescandy and Dendrite).
96. Ind. Newspapers, Inc., supra note 1, at at 456.
97. Id. (observing that McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334 (1995)
involved political speech, which should receive the highest degree of First Amendment
protection. The defamation cases often involve a class of speech which receives questionable
protection, if any. McIntyre involved a municipal ordinance limiting anonymity. Internet
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"summary judgment" test of Doe v. Cahill too stringent, and an imposi-
tion on plaintiffs right to pursue justice. It would "undermine
personal accountability and the search for truth, by requiring plaintiffs
essentially to prove their case before even knowing who the commenta-
tor was."9 8
The Maryland Court of Appeals instructed their trial courts the
following:9 9
"In a defamation action where plaintiff seeks to unmask pseudony-
mous defendants, the lower court must:
(1) Require plaintiff to make an attempt to notify the anonymous
posters of the motion for discovery; a message must be posted on
the message board involved in the contested posting;
(2) Allow the posters time to respond;
(3) Require plaintiff to identify with precision the offending
statements;
(4) Determine whether the complaint contains a prima facie defa-
mation case against the anonymous posters; and
(5) If the first four are satisfied, "balance the anonymous poster's
First Amendment right of free speech against the strength of the
prima facie case of defamation presented by the plaintiff and the
necessity for disclosure of the anonymous defendant's identity."100
Under these instructions, the fifth element is the key. The trial court
is required to balance competing interests against one another, and
make a decision whether the case can go forward.
Notwithstanding, the test is faulty: unless unprotected, or in a
category specifically limited by Supreme Court doctrine, such as com-
mercial speech, all speech receives First Amendment protection, and
its regulation is subject to strict scrutiny. The "strength" of prima facie
cases cannot readily be determined on motion practice; the necessity
for disclosure is obvious, or there would be no attempt to pierce the
veil. Three of the seven court members disagreed with this analysis,
defamation cases involved individual statements, and subsequent litigation); see generally
Caroline E. Strickland, Applying McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission to Anonymous
Speech on the Internet and the Discovery of John Doe's Identity, 58 WAsu. & LEE L. REV.
1537 (2001).
98. Ind. Newspapers, Inc., supra note 1, at 456-457.
99. The court's instructions can be considered obiter dicta, in that the actual case had
been mooted by dismissal of the subject defendants. The Court of Appeals is, however, the
head of the state court system, and charged with the duty, under usual constitutional
principles, of supervision of all lower courts.
100. Supra note 102, at 457 (citing Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 760-61).
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although not with the court's result. The question presented is
whether a balancing test is appropriate.
A. Balancing: Pro and Con
Balancing competing interests, as a method of constitutional
analysis, is a fairly recent tradition.101 Decisions based on balancing
are based on "the identification, valuation, and comparison of compet-
ing interests."102Balancing can exist on an ad hoc basis in each case, in
which the competing elements are present, or it can rest on a macro
basis, when the court determines that between two competing inter-
ests, one is always, absent unusual circumstances, to be given
priority.103 By not making that determination, the Maryland court is
leaving it to the trial courts to decide individual cases, by balancing the
interests in each case.
What factors should the trial courts consider in determining
whether a plaintiff is entitled to the information needed for its case to
go forward, satisfying the fifth element? In balancing the interests in
the INI case, the court would consider the interest of the plaintiff, a
business, in protecting its reputation. A restaurant accused of violat-
ing sanitary regulations would have a strong argument in its favor.
The defendants are simply two citizens exercising their First Amend-
ment rights. Those rights, of course, do not include the right to injure
another by false statements. Without saying more, plaintiffs interest
in being allowed to proceed with the case clearly should prevail.
Another common scenario involves unhappy shareholders
badmouthing management of the corporation. There is a clear interest
of the shareholders in commenting on management and an equally
valid interest of management in protecting its reputation and in not
having the value of its stock damaged. The only acceptable basis for
finding in favor of one party or the other on disclosure would appear to
be the merits of the critical statements. These constitute the key is-
sues in such a case, and one not readily resolved on pretrial motion
practice.
101. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in an Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J.
943 (1987). "In recent years the Court has resorted to balancing in First Amendment cases
with increasing frequency."Id. at 967. The author contrasts balancing with "categorization,"
a decision whether the government act in question falls within a given constitutional
category. Id. at 950-51.
102. Id. at 945.
103. This macro balancing amounts to stating a rule of law.
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There are other questions that could be asked when a trial court
is asked to balance interests before ordering disclosure of the defen-
dant's identity: (1) Is the offending speech of the kind that receives a
high degree of constitutional protection? Here the distinction could be
made on the basis of high level political or intellectual discussion, mea-
sured against adolescent twaddle or rumor mongering;104 (2) How
serious is the damage to plaintiff likely to be, based on the nature of
plaintiffs interest and the likely effect of the speech on that interest?;
(3) What is the extent of the circulation? There is a likelihood that the
defamation will reach a large audience with a common interest (or fa-
miliarity with the plaintiff), enhanced by the protection of anonymity
and the lack of any editorial control. These are cited as the character-
istics of Internet speech which enable abuse to be exploited10 5 ; and (4)
What is the prospect of bullying by the plaintiff, or the filing of a
SLAPP suit?106
The unlikelihood of plaintiff being able to anticipate substantial
damages would affect this side of the equation.10 7 On the other hand,
defamation actions are attacked as SLAPP suits, intended not to col-
lect damages or achieve public vindication, but to silence criticism. 0 8
This point is also made in commentary on the issue. Strickland dis-
cusses one aspect of "cybersmear" as the frequent practice of dissident
shareholders vilifying the corporation and its directors. 0 9 Anonymity
in these cases can be used to protect irresponsible speech." 0 Each of
these questions, however, relates to the substance of the cause of ac-
tion itself, and is ill-suited for a decision at this early stage of
litigation.
104. Aleinikoff, supra note 105, at 967-68 (citing cases in which the Court has deemed
certain speech, e.g. commercial or private matters, to be of "lower constitutional value."); see
generally, Cass Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, 60 U.CHI.L.REv 795 (1993).
105. See, e.g. Ind. Newspapers, Inc., supra note 1 at 458 (Adkins, J. concurring.)
106. A SLAPP ("Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation") suit is one brought
to intimidate a defendant, particularly one commenting on an issue of public interest,
rather than for any proper purpose; see Strickland, supra note 101, at 1552-53.
107. Gleicher, supra note 88, at 362, would balance thus: ("If the first three factors do
not yield a clear outcome, the court should balance the hardships and the relative First
Amendment interests of the plaintiff and defendant, and give preference to whichever party
bears the greater burden under this test.") Id. The first three factors are (1) that reasonable
efforts have been made to notify the defendant and give him an opportunity to respond, (2)
evaluation of the strength of plaintiffs case (public/private figure enters this consideration)
and (3) plaintiff must identify each element of information needed with specificity.
108. Lidsky, supra note 33, at 860 n.11; see also Strickland, supra note 101, at 1553.
109. See generally Dendrite, supra note 67.
110. Victoria Smith Ekstrand, Unmasking Jane and John Doe: Online Anonymity and
the First Amendment, 8 Comm. L. & POLY. 405, 414 (2003). (holding, "But anonymity can
also contribute to defamation, theft, obscenity and the worst kind of hacking.").
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Among those who reject balancing are three justices of the Ma-
ryland Court of Appeals in INI, who concur in the result of the case,
but disagree with the court's ultimate inclusion of balancing. The con-
curring opinions of the three justices have suggested another method
of resolution on the issue.1 1 ' The concurring justices have no quarrel
with points (1), (2) and (3). In addition, they have no serious quarrel
with point (4), although more specificity would be appreciated.11 2
Nonetheless the last point, the balancing test, brings forth a strong
statement of disagreement.
The three justices, speaking through Justice Adkins, first opine
that the wide-open internet encourages an "anything goes" mindset,
highlighting the danger of individuals with no responsibility being free
to make "false or exaggerated statements."1 1 3 Justice Adkins further
explained:
I would venture to guess that on the internet, defamation occurs
more frequently and is broadcast to more people than via any other
medium, past or present. With this in mind, I am reluctant to set
forth additional barriers that would hinder a person seeking to as-
sert a legitimate cause of action in order to remedy the damage
inflicted by a defamatory internet communication.114
The concurring opinion found that no balancing test is needed because
the law of defamation itself balances the interests involved.115 Privi-
leges, both absolute and qualified, protect defendants in some contexts.
Other sources of protection include the barriers imposed by New York
Times v. Sullivan, requiring malice on defendant's part as a constitu-
tional matter in cases involving public officials or public figures, and
the limitations placed on damages in state libel cases are another.1 6
The substantive rules applicable to defamation actions re-
present a judicial balancing of the competing interests.117 Missing
from the concurring analysis is the recognition that the internet
speech, which it denigrates, is constitutionally protected. There is al-
ways a constitutional right on the defense side of the equation, no
111. Ind. Newspapers, Inc., supra note 1, at 457.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 458.
114. Id.
115. Ind. Newspapers, Inc., 966 A.2d at 460.
116. Id. at 458-59.
117. Another approach to balancing would be to characterize both sides of the suit in
light of the abuses of Internet speech: Is it likely that plaintiff is seeking only to silence the
defendant speaker? Or is it likely that the defendant is engaging in irresponsible
cybersmear? Do the facts point to either of these conclusions? One problem with this
approach is that it involves as much fact-finding as the defamation suit itself.
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matter how trivial the speech in question. Ultimately, balancing analy-
sis gives the trial court the discretion to nonsuit a plaintiff, although
all the pleading requirements imposed by law have been met. Assum-
ing procedural compliance and accepting the concurring viewpoint,
involves allowing the plaintiff to identify the defendant and allowing
the lawsuit to proceed.
V. PROTECTED SPEECH SHOULD NOT BE STRATIFIED
The question remains: where is the Constitution in this law?
The courts' references to defendants' constitutional right to anonymous
speech, as one side of the balancing equation, are off the mark.1 18 The
court is in fact determining whether anonymity is to be preserved,
which is an entirely different question. The right to speech is not im-
pacted. A defamation suit is not an invasion of free speech. Each of the
cases discussed, acknowledges the constitutional doctrine protecting
anonymity. In each case except for AOL, the court simply recites the
operative doctrine and does not incorporate it in the ratio decidendi.
This follows logically from the fact that only a negative doctrine is in
play. Finding constitutional protection for anonymity is simply a find-
ing that the speech at issue does not lose its constitutional protection
because it is anonymous. Anonymity merely becomes an additional ad-
jective describing protected speech.
When the court decides to pierce the veil, it allows a case to
move forward under state defamation law. State substantive law, as
limited by the New York Times doctrines and the fact that the speech
was initially anonymous, becomes legally irrelevant. Subsequently,
this suggests that the question of whether speech is characterized as
high level or low level should not be a factor of significance, and that
Justice Stevens' language in McIntyre has been given undue weight.
All speech that falls outside five unprotected categories is pro-
tected, although specific rules govern certain categories of speech.119
The protection given to unattractive speech, when subjected to content
discriminatory legislation, is illustrated by United States v. Stevens,
where the Third Circuit gave full strict scrutiny protection to videos
graphically showing pit bulls fighting to the death.120 Cases such as
Stevens show that while the courts may talk of political speech as re-
ceiving the highest level of protection, it is only in extremely limited
118. In Dendrite and INI.
119. Commercial speech is judged by a lower standard than other speech. See
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 21, 1085 et.seq.
120. 533 F.3d 218 (3d Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 1984 (2009).
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areas like erogenous zoning that the evaluation has constitutional
teeth.121 Nevertheless, the McIntyre case was decided in 1995, and the
Supreme Court has not decided a case involving the constitutional pro-
tection of anonymity since then. At that time the internet was active,
but its growth since that date has been exponential.
There appears to be a cosmic distance between the political
speech protected by McIntyre and the dialog between aforementioned
web posters RockyRaccoonMD and Suze, some of which derives from
Justice Stevens's expansive language; but characterizing the Maryland
Internet speech in INI as requiring lesser protection involves a judg-
ment with respect to its innate worth. RockyRaccoonMD and Suze
may lack the sophistication of Hamilton and Madison, but their dialog
in part expressed their distress regarding a structure that should have
been historically preserved had been demolished. 1 22 In any event, they
were individuals exercising their First Amendment rights of free
speech.
In comparison, cases such as Stevens should emphasize for the
public that the fewer distinctions required in First Amendment analy-
sis, the better.123 Moreover, in McIntyre, Justice Stevens expressly
noted that "[wihen a law burdens core political speech we apply 'exact-
ing scrutiny' and" its regulation must be "narrowly tailored to serve an
overriding state interest."124 Nothing in that statement assists us in
classifying speech as either political/nonpolitical, or high/low level. By
the same token, Internet speech can range from the highest to the low-
est level of social value; but unless the speech falls into a specific
category, the Supreme Court will consign to a lower standard, whereas
content-based regulation will be based on strict scrutiny.125
Denigration of Internet speech occurs in virtually all the cases
cited by the Maryland court. The volume, universal quality, and ease
of access to the Internet are commented on by the courts in formulating
doctrine for piercing the veil.126 Additionally, the internet is a ubiqui-
tous modern phenomenon, and constitutional protection should not be
based on the apple pie image Justice Stevens projects in McIntyre: a
community where public issues are intelligently debated by anony-
121. Id.
122. Ind. Newspapers, Inc., 966 A.2d at 444.
123. See Young v. American Mini-Theaters, 427 U.S. 50 (1976); see Renton v. Playtime
Theaters, Inc. 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (holding that cities were permitted to zone movie theaters
on the basis of their content, non-obscene "adult" films. The judgment of municipalities
between classes of protected speech was upheld, in what is essentially a zoning case.).
124. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 347.
125. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 21, at 987.
126. Id.
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mous pamphleteers learned in the history of the Greek democracies.
That language is unfortunate in suggesting that the fact that the
speech in question was of a high level helped the Court to its decision.
Talley and McIntyre were both undoubtedly correctly decided
and are correct to note the high level of speech ostensibly being pro-
tected; but, that language should not be used to limit the protection of
speech by those with less sophistication. The unchallenged acceptance
of these dicta by the lower courts has led to a lack of analysis of its
proper limitations. A rule that invites state courts to consider the
value of protected speech, and to discriminate among expression, un-
duly limits speech.
VI. CONCLUSION
The first four of the steps in the Maryland court's procedure are
entirely appropriate. The requirement that defamation plaintiffs state
a viable cause of action demonstrates their efforts to identify their de-
famer and assures that notice and an opportunity to reply to the
defendant are entirely defensible requirements of motion practice. It
further demonstrates the conditions of the plaintiffs discovery of de-
fendant's identity; but they are matters of motion practice, not of
constitutional dimension.
The Supreme Court cases cited above, and many lower court
decisions, invoke the historic pseudonymous writers such as Tom
Paine, the Federalist authors (Madison, Hamilton, Jay) and John Mar-
shall, all of whom wrote at a time when debate on public issues took
place through such publications. Often, the author was known to the
public, or at least to the cognoscenti. Notwithstanding, not all pam-
phleteers were at the level of those writers. The anonymous leaf-letters
of that era can be compared with the men who signed the Declaration
of Independence with their real names, and pledged their "lives, their
fortunes and their sacred honor" to the cause of American indepen-
dence.127 Whatever the influences on the founders by anonymous
writings, their acts to which they were willing to sign their names, are
far more important to our history.
127. Historic lore notes the boldness of John Hancock's signature, and Charles Carroll's
appending his address ("of Carrollton") to his signature so that King George would have no
doubt of his identity. Consider citing to more than mere historic lore. For example, "the bold
flourish with which he signed the Declaration of Independence has made his name
synonymous with 'signature."' http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/254053/John-
Hancock.
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Ultimately the word "responsibility" should enter into the con-
versation. When a court is asked to decide a case by balancing the
competing interests, it essentially takes two rules of law or status, and
applies each to the facts of the case. The judge must make a fact-spe-
cific value judgment. The factors that lead to that judgment define the
law. The First Amendment right to speak anonymously is an impor-
tant one. The right of a defamed plaintiff to redress, if that speech is
defamatory, is analytically the other side of the same coin, and in that
sense equally important. Ultimately the question posed by cases like
INI will turn on the burden borne by the plaintiff. The law of defama-
tion imposes its own burdens on the plaintiffs recovery.
Take the Internet out of the equation and where does the case
come down? Does a defendant have the right to defame at will, taking
no responsibility for her statements? Is there a reason for a medium
capable of anonymous speech to insulate an anonymous speaker from
liability? Do fundamental canons of personal responsibility not man-
date that speakers be willing to stand behind what they say? Are the
Supreme Court's leaflet precedents particularly relevant to cases in-
volving anonymous defamation? Should they be? The courts have
assumed that they do, but the high court's jurisprudence evolved not
from defamation cases, but from attempts by the government to limit
private speech and censor Internet content.
If we simply acknowledge that speech does not gain protection
from the speaker's anonymity, we come closer to a sound constitutional
policy. Anonymous speech should receive the same protection it would
receive if it were identified with the speaker, no more and no less. Fur-
thermore, the rights of plaintiffs, as noted above, do not derive from
the Constitution. Plaintiffs in Internet cases are subject to the same
limits as plaintiffs in New York Times or other defamation cases; how-
ever, they should not be denied access to the courts when they fail an
ill-defined and probably unworkable balancing test. Consequently,
every person should be responsible for his or her actions. There is
nothing commendable about anonymous libel or slander and scant rea-
son to protect it. As long as pleading rules embody the concept of the
courts being open to the assertion of rights, they should not be fortified
to hinder cases because modern modes of communication have facili-
tated anonymity.
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